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Introduction
The end of Socialism in Eastern Europe has opened up the opportunity to transform the centrally planned economies into market economies and to integrate Eastern and Western Europe politically and economically. The transition process within Eastern Europe and the integration process with
Western Europe are the focal points of this paper. The paper examines the overlap between transition and integration, sketches briefly the situation in the Eastern European countries with respect to the economic transition and to the European integration process, discusses the institutional framework for European Integration, describes the Acquis Communautaire and derives some policy conclusions concerning necessary reforms within the Eastern European countries and the EU.
Overlap and Coincidence between Transition and Integration
Transition and reorientation towards Western Europe have been the two decisive chalenges for the Central and Eastern European Countries (CEECs) since 1989. 1 Whereas in the early 1990s the transition from the central planning system to a market economy was the main goal of economic policies, the requirements for closer integration with the Western European countries have increasingly gained importance at the end of the 1990s. The overlap between these two processes is represented in Figure 1 .
For the transition process from a centrally planned economy towards a market economy, three main areas of reforms have been identified, namely macroeconomic stabilization, real adjustment at the microeconomic level and creation of the institutional framework (cf. Siebert 1991) . Macroeconomic stabilization seeks to overcome the instabilities relating to the price level, the Sources: Siebert (1999); Siebert (1991); World Bank (1995) ; own additions and representation.
exchange rate and the state budget, which emerged in many transition economies after the onset of economic reform. The reforms at the microeconomic levels aim to establish viable markets through conversion of state conglomerates into separate legal entities (comercialization), privatization of these firms, price liberalization and opening up to international trade.
Furthermore, the possibilities for firms to enter into and exit from the market have to be assured. After the establishment of these macro-and microeconomic reforms, prices will tend to mirror world market prices and thus to reflect the costs and the scarcity of goods and factors. However, the allocation of factors and inputs within the firms inherited from the Socialist era may not fully correspond to the new prices both at the input and output level; some output may not be competitive under the new conditions; part of the physical capital stock may have become obsolete; and national and international competition may intensify. Therefore, individual domestic firms and the whole economy experience a transformation "shock".
The reform of the institutional framework has to ensure that a meaningful and beneficial decentralization of economic decisions occurs. The new legal foundation has to establish and enforce private property rights, a viable law of contract and a law of enterprises. Furthermore, the responsibilities of monetary policy and financial intermediation have to be separated through the establishment of a two-tier banking system. Finally, the independence of the central bank has to be guaranteed in order to ensure macroeconomic stabilization (cf. Siebert 1999) . These three areas of reforms are interdependent in the sense that success in one area will be attained only if sufficient progress is made in the other two. Furthermore, simultaneous progress in all these areas is also required to gain credibility for economic reforms. The link between institutional reforms and economic growth as well as the progress in transition towards a market economy in 25 transition countries are discussed more closely in Piazolo (1999) . A more fundamental description of the overall societal effects of the transition from socialism to capitalism is offered by Kornai (2000) . reforms necessary on a microeconomic level (as indicated in Figure 1 ), the third criterion covers the institutional framework and the macroeconomic stabilization. In the primary objective concerning the rule of law, the first Copenhagen criterion is also targeted toward institutional capacity-building.
Consequently, there is a considerable overlap between the requirements for transition in the CEECs on the one hand and for the integration with Western
Europe on the other hand.
The Economic Differences between the Advanced Transition Countries and the EU
Economic disparities between the EU and the candidate countries are still huge by the end of the 1990s as reflected in Table 1 . The Table provides data for the aggregate of the 15 present EU members (labeled EU15), the ten transition countries that have applied for membership (the dates of the application are given in Table 3 -see below) and for three other applicants (Cyprus, Malta and Turkey). (2000); own calculations.
The economic size of the candidates for EU membership is small compared to the EU15. Poland as the largest transition country likely to join the EU has an economic size of less than 2 percent of the EU15. All other transition countries with a candidate status have a economic size of less than 1 percent of the EU15.
In terms of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) per capita, the inhabitants in the candidate transition countries reach between 7 (Bulgaria) and 44 percent (Slovenia) of the EU15 average. The difference in development is, however, better represented by the data about the GDP per capita given in Purchasing Power Parity. According to this measure, GDP per capita in the ten transition countries ranges from 23 percent of the EU15 average for Bulgaria up to 68 percent for Slovenia. Table 1 displays also the ratio of the real GDP for 1998 relative to the GDP for 1989 and shows that only few transition countries were already able to reach the pre-transition level of economic activity. In 1998, only Poland and Slovenia had passed the 1989 GDP level and Slovakia had just reached it.
Latvia's economy in 1998 had shrunk to 59 percent of its 1989 level.
How far the candidate countries are from the EU15 is also underlined by the disparity of sectoral composition of GDP indicated in Table 1 This structure is the legacy from the centrally planned economy. The central planners had a pronounced preference for (heavy) industry while disregarding and even discriminating against the tertiary sector. According to Gros and Suhrcke (2000) , this characteristic would allow -even after ten years of transition -an economist without any access to time series data to distinguish the previously centrally planned economies from all other countries in the world. Furthermore, the formerly centrally planned economies have a higher energy use than expected from their GDP level and have a higher proportion of their population in secondary and tertiary education. Apart from these findings, there are few characteristics that markedly distinguish the advanced transition economies from other countries. Consequently, Gros and Suhrcke (2000) conclude that transition has apparently been accomplished in Central Europe. However, as the latest annual reports from the European Commission (1999b, 1999c) on the CEECs' progress towards accession discuss, the CEECs still have to advance in their reform process. In this perspective, the transition continues to a market economy that can stand the competitive pressures within a common market of advanced industrialized economies.
The preeminent importance of the EU15 as a trading partner for the candidate countries is also shown in Table 1 . Between 45 percent (Bulgaria) and 69.4 percent (Slovenia) of total imports originate from the EU15 and between 38 (Lithuania) and 72.9 percent (Hungary) of all exports are heading towards the EU. For most advanced transition countries, the share of the EU for total export or total import is near or above 60 percent, which represents a marked change from the pre-1989 trade pattern.
The Institutional Framework for European Integration
The so-called Europe Agreements were initiated in the early 1990s to provide a framework for the gradual economic and political integration of the CEECs with the present EU members. free trade agreements and are, consequently, the most far-reaching agreements that the EU has ever signed with third countries (cf. European Commission 1999a).
In order to bridge the period until the Europe Agreements entered into force, the EU agreed upon Interim Agreements with the six first CEECs signatories and upon Free Trade Agreements with the other four CEECs. These temporary agreements expired with the establishment of the validity of the Europe Agreements (see Table 2 ). With the Interim Agreements entering into force, custom duties applicable to imports into the EU were eliminated for manufactured goods from the involved CEECs. In January 1994 and in January 1995 most residual duties on sensitive goods were deleted. Poland has been granted an exception for certain products of the car industry allowing the gradual reduction of the tariffs over a longer time period. Similarly, Hungary has obtained an exception for steel products (cf. European Commission 1999a). The breakdown of intra-CMEA trade and the striking trade (re-)orientation of the CEECs towards the EU are examined in Piazolo (1997) .
countries does tend to occur. The application and accession of Denmark and Ireland was determined by the circumstances of Great Britain. Portugal's application and accession was effectively linked to the Spanish case.
Furthermore, it has been claimed that the early application of Austria induced a quicker application of the Scandinavian countries because of the joint EFTA link (cf. Preston 1997) . As an exception, Greece was able to disconnect itself from the other two Mediterranean applicants. Since the accession of new countries has to be ratified by all EU members in a time consuming procedure, a clustering of East European countries that has materialized during the opening stage of negotiations is likely to remain relevant for the actual accession. This danger of standstill within European policies also emerges from Table 4 presenting Ministers a majority of votes has to represent also a majority of the European population in order to be decisive.
The Acquis Communautaire
Countries acceding to the EU are required to adopt the acquis communautaire, which represents the established institutional and regular framework with respect to European integration. An acceding country to the EU is obliged to accept and effectively implement the entirety of the acquis as it has evolved until the date of membership to the Union. The acquis consists of (1) Table 5 .
The number and diversity of member states has also increased since the first enlargement and will rise considerably with the Eastern enlargement. The members of an EU with more than 20 states will have to cope with increasingly different problems. Consequently, the processes of deepening and widening the EU will continually grow in difficulty. The policy conclusions at the end of the paper lay out that an enlarged EU will require provisions that allow a subset of members the flexibility to advance further integration without extending automatically the acquis which would make future enlargement rounds even harder. For a Union with more than 20 countries, deepening and widening at the same time appears to be only feasible within an multi-speed Europe. For the presently negotiating candidates, the complexities of the present acquis requires a close examination, of which parts should be implemented immediately, which parts should be postponed until full membership and for which parts transition periods after EU membership should be negotiated. This has be examined, for example, by the World Bank for the case of Poland (World Bank, 1997) . Extending this World Bank study, Bucknall (1999) examines the costs of Poland's compliance with EU environmental standards as ascertained by the acquis. The chapter entitled "Other" deals with the issues not anticipated before or unique to the acceding country.
Source: European Commission (2000b).
Even if it is arguable whether the acquis constitutes the best institutional framework for the transition countries due to the existing development gap relative to the current EU members, it is likely, that the acquis will stabilize the continuing political and economic reform process by given clear targets for institutional-building.
Due to its enormous size and complexity, the implementation of the acquis creates also a considerable adjustment burden for the joining countries. The open conflict between the EU and Poland concerning the acquis chapter "agriculture" in early 2000 indicates that the complete integration of the CEECs into the EU will occur with substantial friction and will require several years.
For example, the Polish negotiators regard it as absolutely necessary that local producers can sell within Poland meat and milk products that do not fulfill the high EU hygiene standards for several years after EU membership. Further friction to the negotiations about the acquis is added through the disagreements about the CEECs' access to the structural funds and to the direct transfer payments to farmers within the Common Agricultural Policy as well as about the transition periods for the free mobility of persons.
In the latest annual reports from the European Commission (1999b Commission ( , 1999c have to muster refreshed verve to advance substantially on their reform path.
Accession Dates
The problems with the limited capacity to compete within the EU and with the adoption of the acquis point either to the necessity of a delayed EU accession The integration of eight Eastern European Countries plus two Mediterranean countries at the same time might sound like an impossible task, but the overall population of these ten countries is with 75 million inhabitants smaller than the population of Germany (82 million). In this perspective the task of a comprehensive enlargement seems to be manageable. Nevertheless, the full integration of these ten countries into the institutional and administrative framework of the EU will require considerable time. Consequently, the EU will 
Conclusions
As the paper has shown, there is a considerable overlap between the reforms necessary during the transition from a centrally planned economy towards a market economy and the reforms required to join the European Union. Western Europe, also the present EU members will benefit. In this perspective, a clearly scheduled institutional integration process to complement the advanced economic integration process between Eastern and Western Europe is the best way to foster certainty and prosperity within Europe.
